OSIsoft。 USERS CONFERENCE 2016

April 4-8, 2016 | San Francisco

TRANSFORM YOUR WORLD



Bri Rolston
GkJuju Security Consulting
April 2016

Geek Juju?

- ICS Security Lead at Monsanto
- Any experience in cyber security?
 - Security operations
 - Code security
 - Incident response
 - Telecomm security
 - Threat management
- Any experience in ICS?
 - Idaho National Laboratory (INL)
 - DoD, DHS, and DOE CIP experience
 - Kimberly-Clark Corporation

Technical Biases

My hat is blue....

- If they can attack it, we can defend it.
- Breaker not a maker
- Where my thoughts tend to wander....
 - Trends in malware use & creation
 - Analyzing attack surface
 - Fingerprinting attack teams

Shifting Threat Perspective

Threat from industry perspective

- Operational risk
 - Risk = f (Probability, Impact)
- Priorities
 - People
 - Process
 - Technology
 - Security
- More on this in previous research
 - Attack Technology Analysis & Characterization (ATAC)
 - Response Analysis Characterization & Tools (ReACT)

Starting with the ATAC

They attack. I defend. Shiny object!

- Cyber defense would be more EFFICIENT if I
 - Stop defending all targets the same way
 - Identify the high value targets on my network first
 - Evaluate the attack surface

Tools used

- Reversing off the target (software patent)
- ATAC (attack styles, FSL, ATAC Life Cycle)
- ReACT (ASA, ASE, FSM)

Attack Planning

Technology is a tool people use to get work done and to solve business problems.

Adversaries	Attack Work Flow	Attack Technology		
 Have operational goals Are creatures of habit Solve problems uniquely Plan attacks based on previous factors 	 Makes it possible to characterize threat Describes the life cycle & work Drives selection of attack tech 	 Shows how adversary solves problems Can be used to identify most likely attack paths 		
ATTACK STYLE				

ATAC Life Cycle

Hackers have project managers, too.

Target Development	Exploitation & Pivoting	Attack Operations	Attack EoL
Design	Implementation	Maintenance	EoL
 Work planning Identify ops goals Develop attack strategy Create tool kit 	 Point of Entry (PoE) Foothold Elevate privilege Pivot to next system 	 Achieve ops goals Shift in technical focus Different technical needs than E&P Lots of infra. 	• End of technical work
Network mappingVuln scanningSpear-phishing	0-daysPass the hashElev. of Priv. (EoP)	C&C channelsKeystroke loggingRemote admin	Clean up


ATAC FSM = Epic Fail

lt's not you. It's me.

- ATAC FSM not easily understood
- Threats, attack vectors, 0-days....Oh, my!
- Reboot my comms
 - Makers not breakers
 - ICS types not hackers
 - C-suite not geeks

OSIsoft's Idea: Bow Tie Analysis

Common risk analysis method



Reboot

ATAC + Bow Tie Analysis

- Threat analysis
 - Stuxnet 0-day
 - Print spooler attack

Apply it to PI Server

Mitigating Cyber Risk

ATAC + Bow Tie Analysis

- Attacker's goal
 - Start as remote unauthorized user
 - Open a "door" on the system
 - Elevate privilege to admin on PI Server
- Defender's goal
 - Mitigate cyber security risk


Attacker's Trifecta

Affect I factor. Mitigate risk.

- Attackers must have:
 - Vulnerability or config weakness
 - Network comms path
 - Exploit specific to both
- Print spooler 0-day used in Stuxnet
 - Windows OS
 - RPC comms
 - 0-day exploit code


ATAC + Bow Tie Analysis

Why the 0-day worked



ATAC + Bow Tie Analysis

What could have been done



Contact Information

If you need to catch me after you're fully caffeinated.....

Bri Rolston

Chief Research Geek
GkJuju Security Consulting
gkjuju@gmail.com

Questions

Please wait for the microphone before asking your questions

State your name & company

Please remember to...

Complete the Online Survey for this session





http://ddut.ch/osisoft

감사합니다

Danke

Gracias

谢谢

Merci

Thank You

ありがとう

Спасибо

Obrigado

If questions = 0 Then presentation = fail End If

OSIsoft。 USERS CONFERENCE 2016

April 4-8, 2016 | San Francisco

TRANSFORM YOUR WORLD