




DoD: GSA/DoD Control Systems Cyber Policy and Strategy

Presented by **Daryl Haegley**, Program Manager, Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Energy, Installations, and Environment

What's in Your Network?






245 = Avg # Days Undiscovered Adversary
DHS ICS CERT

Same Meaning but Different: *PIT, CS, PIT-CS, ICS, OT, SCADA, CPS*

- PIT = Platform Information Technology
- CS = Control Systems
- PIT-CS = PIT Control Systems
- ICS = Industrial Control Systems
- OT = Operational Technology
- SCADA = Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
- CPS = Cyber Physical Systems
- IoT = Internet of Things



DoD = PIT; DHS & NIST = ICS, SCADA, CPS; Commercial = OT, IoT


UNCLASSIFIED

Operational Energy

Weapon Platforms

Buildings

>500 Installations
>250K Buildings
>200K Structures



Electrical and HVAC



Pumps and Motors



Nuclear




Vehicles/Charging



Typical Controller


Medical

Manufacturing




Same Commercial Device Installed Across DoD Enterprise


What's in Your Building?



SANS '16 Survey - 235 Companies

“Greatest Risk for Compromise”





CBRNE-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive

Vendors & Integrators

Acuity Brands Roam Advantage Controls ALC Alerton AIE Alerton BACtalk Alerton
 BCM-WEB American Auto-Matrix Auto Pilot American Auto-Matrix Andover Controls
 Continuum Asi controls Auto Matrix Sage Automated Logic WebCTRL Automated Logic
 Barber Coleman Network 8000 Bristol Babcock CAPRON Carrier Carrier Comfort Network
 Carrier Com-Trol Control Microsystems SCADAPack Cylon Unitron UC32 Daikin Data
 Aire Dell Vostro Delta Controls ORCA Distech Echelon i.Lon Emerson-Liebert
 EXHAUSTO Flygt ITT Industries APP 700 General Electric WESDAC General Electric
 Honeywell Excel 5000 Honeywell WEBs-AX HSQ Technology Invensys I/A Series Invensys
 Micronet Invensys Network 8000 Johnson Controls Facility Explorer Johnson Controls
 Metasys Johnson Controls M-Series KMC LANDIS Landis & Staefa Integral MS2000
 Landis & Staefa Liebert SiteGate LOYTEC Electronics L-VIS Lynxspring JENEsys Merlin
 Gerin PowerLogic Microwave Data Systems Mitsubishi Motorola SCADA Systems Odessa
 Engineering OmniaPRO Orion Controls Paragon EC7000 Series Racco Reliable Controls
 MACH-ProWebSys Richards-Zeta Robert Shaw DMS RUGID Schneider Electric I/A Series
 Schneider Electric PowerLogic Siebe Network 8000 Siemens ACCESS Siemens Apogee
 Siemens Desigo PX Siemens Synco 700 Staefa Staefa/Siemens STULZ Air Technologies
 TAC I/A Series TAC Network 8000 TAC Xenta TAC Vista Telvent Smart Grid Solution
 Trane Tracer Trane Tracer Summit Trane Varitrac TREND Trend Control Systems IQ2
 Tridium Vykon

Operating Software Options

•Axon CAT SARL Desigo Insight KNX STANDARD ABB Symphony Plus OptimaxRev 4 ABB Symphony Plus 800xA SV 5.1 ABB Symphony Plus Composer 6.0 ABB Symphony Plus S+ Operations 1.1 Alerton BACTalk Envision 2.0 Alerton BACTalk Envision 2.6 Alerton VisualLogic Allen-Bradley RSLogix 500 Allen-Bradley RSLogix 500, RSView32 Automated Logic ExecB 6.0 Automated Logic SuperVision WebCTRL 5.5 Automated Logic WebCTRL WebCTRL 3 Automated Logic WebCTRL WebCTRL 3.0 Automated Logic WebCTRL WebCTRL 5 Automated Logic WebCTRL WebCTRL 5.2 Automated Logic WebCTRL WebCTRL 4.1 SP1 Automated Logic WebCTRL WebCTRL Automated Logic ExecB 4.1 SP1 Automated Logic ExecB drv_ige_4-02-175 Automated Logic ExecB drv_melgr_vanilla_4-02-175 Automated Logic ExecB Automated Logic Supervision 2.6b Automated Logic WebCTRL 4 SP1B Automated Logic WebCTRL 4.1 SP1 Automated Logic WebCTRL 4.1 SP1b Automated Logic WebCTRL SVR 5.5 Calsense Command Center 4.15.11.20 Carrier Comfort Network Comfort Network 3.0 Control Microsystems ClearSCADA 2009 Ed. R2.2 Data flow Systems HyperTAC 2 Data flow Systems HyperTAC HT3 Delta Controls ORCA ORCAview 3.30 Delta Controls ORCA ORCAview 3.40 Delta Controls Orcaview 3.22 Delta Controls Orcaview 3.30 Delta Controls OrcaView 3.3 Delta Controls Orcaview 3.33 Delta Controls Orcaview Delta Controls, TAC ORCA, I/NET ORCAview, Seven Rel 2.15 EFACAC Prism ERI Siemens Insight 3.6 GE, Intellution Proficy, iFIX, FIX Desktop _, _,4.0, _ General Electric Cimplicity Plant Edition 6.1 General Electric Multilin Config Pro 5.03 General Electric Proficy Cimplicity 7.0 General Electric Proficy iFIX 4.0 Honeywell Symmetre Station 3.5 Symmetre 3.5 Honeywell Webstation-AX Niagara Niagara 3.5.40.1 HSQ Miser 6.06 HSQ Miser HSQ, Sun Microsystems Miser, Xview 6.06 Iconics Genesis32 Genesis32 8.3 Iconics Genesis32 Genesis32 9.13 Iconics HMI SCADA Solutions Genesis 32 3.12.005 InduSoft Web Studio Intellution 7 Intellution FIX32 3.5 Intellution FIX32 Intellution iFIX 3.5 Intellution IFIX Intellution iFIX Reporter ITT Flygt AquaView AquaView 1.50 Johnson Controls Metasys 6.0.0.9000 Johnson Controls Metasys GX9100 7.05A Johnson Controls Metasys Metasys 5 Johnson Controls Metasys Metasys 5.1 Johnson Controls Metasys Project Builder 5:1 Johnson Controls Metasys Project Builder 3 Johnson Controls Metasys 5 Johnson Controls Metasys 12.04 Johnson Controls Metasys 2.0.0.70.0 Johnson Controls Metasys 5.2.0.5400 Johnson Controls Metasys Johnson Controls M-Graphics 5.3 Microsoft Explorer N/A N/A N/A N/A Pneu-Logic Pneu-Logic RACO RACO 3.14 Rainbird MAXICOM2 Central Control 4.3 ReLab Software ClearView-SCADA 7.2.8 Reliable Controls MACH ProWebSys RC-Studio 2.0 Robert Shaw Digital Management System Operator Interface 11.0 Rockwell FactoryTalk Service Platform 2.30 Rockwell FactoryTalk View, Rsview Site Edition, Supervisory 6.0, 6.0 Rockwell Factory Talk 6.0 Rockwell Automation FactoryTalk View Machine Edition 5.1 Rockwell Automation FactoryTalk View Site Edition 4.0 Rockwell Automation FactoryTalk View Site Edition 5.1 Rockwell Automation FactoryTalk View Site Edition Rockwell Automation RSView Supervisory Edition 4.0 Rockwell Automation RSView Supervisory Edition Rockwell Automation RSView32 7.600.00 ScadaTEC SCADASIS 5.8.14.213 Schneider Electric PowerLogic ION Enterprise 5.6 Schneider Electric PowerLogic ION Enterprise Siebe Network 8000 Signal 4.4.1 Siemens S7 300 STEP 7 Siemens Apogee Insight Siemens Desigo Insight Siemens Insight Desigo Insight 2.31 Siemens Insight Desigo Insight 2.35.021 Siemens WinPM.Net 3.2 SP3 SUBNET Solutions SubSTATION Explorer 1.3.0 SUBNET Solutions SubSTATION Explorer 1.5.7 Sun Microsystems Xview 3.2 Symantec Backup Exec 2011? TAC I/A Series WorkPlace Tech 5.7 TAC I/A Series Workbench TAC I/A Series WorkPlace Tech 5.7.2 TAC 4.1 TAC Signal, XPSI & ZPSIPC Teletrol eBuilding Telvent OaSys DNA 7.4.* Trane Tracer SC Tracer 3.5 Trane Tracer Summit Tracer 11 Trane Tracer Summit Tracer 16 Trane Tracer Summit Tracer 17 Trane Tracer Summit V14 Tracer 14 Trane Tracer Summit V16 Tracer 16 Trane Tracer Summit V17 Tracer 17 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.428 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.430.v1 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.431.v1 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.514 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.514.v1 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.522 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.522.v1 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.522.v2 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.522V1 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.527.v1 Tridium Vykon Niagara 2.301.529 Tridium

“8 Star Memo”

Cybersecurity of DoD Critical Infrastructure ICS



COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
(USPACOM)
CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-4028

February 11, 2016

The Honorable Ash Carter
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon, Washington D.C.

Mr. Secretary,

We respectfully request your assistance in providing focus and visibility on an emerging threat that we believe will have serious consequences on our ability to execute assigned missions if not addressed – cybersecurity of DOD critical infrastructure Industrial Control Systems (ICS). We believe this issue is important enough to eventually include in your cyber scorecard. We must establish clear ownership policies at all levels of the Department, and invest in detection tools and processes to baseline normal network behavior from abnormal behavior. Once we've established this accountability, we should be able to track progress for establishing acceptable cybersecurity for our infrastructure ICS.

The Department of Homeland Security reported a seven-fold increase in cyber incidents between 2010 and 2015 on critical infrastructure (e.g., Platform Information Technology (PIT) systems, ICS, and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems) that control the flow of electricity, water, fuel, etc. Many nefarious cyber payloads (e.g., Shodan, Havex and BlackEnergy) and emerging ones have the potential to debilitate our installations' mission critical infrastructure.

As Geographic Combatant Commanders with homeland defense responsibilities and much at stake in this new cyber-connected world, we request your support.

Sincerely and Very Respectfully,

WILLIAM E. GORTNEY
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander, U.S. Northern Command

Sincerely and Very Respectfully,

HARRY B. HARRIS
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command



- Establish Clear Ownership
- Include in Scorecard
- Invest in Detection Tools
- 7x cyber incidents



What's the Real Cyber Risk?

“The threat is real and the risks are high, but our exposure is low...the control systems don't connect to the internet.”

The risk of a damaging cyberattack is “greater than zero ... the real threat is Mother Nature and humans doing stupid stuff.”

Marcus Sachs, CSO of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)

NERC SME: Utility Cyber Attack “Very Unlikely”

What's the Real Cyber Risk?

- Project SHINE (SHodan INtelligence Extraction) scanned the internet looking for SCADA and ICS devices. “Found more than 2 million (control) system devices directly connected to the Internet”
- Targeted ICS attacks in the US have caused, “loss of electric and water SCADA, damage to manufacturing lines, shutdown of HVAC systems, and damage to facility equipment including critical motors”

Control Systems Cybersecurity Expert, Joseph M. Weiss, recognized international authority on cybersecurity, control systems and system security

30yr SME: Utility Cyber Attack “Very Likely”


Mission Assurance Dependency

- Mar'16: RPA mission based in U.S. was flying a targeting mission overseas
- Routine maintenance power outage stateside, the RPA feed temporarily lost power
- Target was able to get "away and is able to continue plotting against the U.S. and our allies"



Was it Maintenance or Cyber? How Can You Tell?

Tornado Sirens Hacked in Dallas Texas



- **11:42 pm 156 emergency weather sirens blared**
- **90 min to 1.3 million residents**
- **1,000s of calls flooded Dallas 911 system**
 - **Real emergency responses delayed**
- **1:20 a.m. officials: “unplug radio systems & repeater, turn siren system completely off.”**
- **Mayor Mike Rawlings called hack “an attack on our emergency notification system.” Urged upgrades to Dallas’s chronically and sometimes dangerously wonky electronic infrastructure and promised the city would “identify and prosecute those responsible.”**

Locating Connected Devices

SHODAN

The search engine for B

Shodan is the world's first search engine for Internet

Create a Free Account Getting Started

SHODAN "default password"

TOP COUNTRIES

United States	7,391
China	2,281
India	1,906
Saudi Arabia	1,481
Argentina	1,263

TOP SERVICES

Telnet	23,987
HTTP	4,179
FTP	3,357
HTTP (8080)	1,058
HTTP (81)	445

TOP ORGANIZATIONS

NTT America	2,739
Telecom Argentina S.A.	1,109
SaudiNet	839
TATA Communications	585
Comcast Cable	489

TOP OPERATING SYSTEMS

Linux 2.6.x	15
Linux 2.4.x	7
Windows 7 or 8	1
Linux 3.x	1

Total results: 33,575

161.58.142.58
vsgd17s.securites.net
NTT America
Added on 2016-03-16 11:19:00
United States, Englewood, Colorado
Details

61.19.28.98
The Communication Authority of Thailand
Added on 2016-03-16 11:18:00
Thailand
Details

60.173.217.8
China Telecom Anhui
Added on 2016-03-16 11:18:00
China, Hefei
Details

61.16.177.1
mum-elastic-17
Direct Internet
Added on 2016-03-16 11:18:00
India, Mumbai
Details



"Life is hard.
It's harder
if you're
stupid."



ord


?

Cancel

[forgot password?](#)

What's the Risk of Exposing Energy Consumption Data?


Facility Level



- Generators for individual critical loads



Site / Campus Level



Regional / Enterprise Level




 Usage or Criticality?




“All Energy Data is UNCLASSIFIED”... True?

Embracing Silicon Valley Crowdsourcing: “Bug Bountys” *Will Utilities & ICS be Next?*



Cost: \$175K vs. Typical Contractor \$1M



National Security Agency/Central Security Service



INFORMATION ASSURANCE DIRECTORATE

Seven Steps to Effectively Defend Industrial Control Systems

Securing Government Assets through Combined Traditional Security and Information Technology: An Interagency Security Committee White Paper

February 2015



Interagency Security Committee



90 Cyber Protection Team (CPT) Industrial Control Systems/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (ICS/SCADA) Plan

Version 1.1
18 April 2016



Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies

Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team
September 2016



NASA

Office of Inspector General

Office of Audits

INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM SECURITY WITHIN NASA'S CRITICAL AND SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE

February 8, 2017

Report No. IG-17-011

GAO Highlights

Highlights of GAO-17-011, a review of cybersecurity reports.

Why GAO Did This Study

Federal facilities contain building and access control systems—computers, transmitters and control building, transmitters, work on elevators, fireproof power, and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning—that are increasingly being connected to other information systems and the internet. This increased connectivity heightens their vulnerability to cyber attacks, which could jeopardize security, mission, damage operational ability to control and their relations, or cause physical harm to the facilities or their occupants.

GAO's objective was to examine the extent to which NASA and other stakeholders are prepared to address cyber risks to building and access control systems in federal facilities. GAO reviewed DHS and other stakeholders' activities to protect federal facilities from cyber attacks, needed selected IT-related facilities to enhance operational ability to address cyber risks to these systems, and implement systems about the operational ability of building and access control systems and related systems. GAO also reviewed GSA's security assessment process and a sample of reports.

FEDERAL FACILITY CYBERSECURITY DHS and GSA Should Address Cyber Risk to Building and Access Control Systems

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken preliminary steps to begin to understand the cyber risk to building and access control systems in federal facilities. For example, in 2015, components of DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) conducted a pilot assessment of the physical security and cybersecurity of a federal facility. However, significant work remains.

- Lack of a strategy. DHS lacks a strategy that: (1) defines the problem, (2) identifies the roles and responsibilities, (3) analyzes the resources needed, and (4) identifies a methodology for assessing this cyber risk. A strategy is a starting point in assessing this risk. The absence of a strategy that clearly defines the risk and responsibilities, as well as responsibility, with DHS for use as a basis of action within the Department. For example, no one within DHS is assessing or addressing cyber risk to building and access control systems particularly at the facility level from a building perspective. The Industrial Mission System (IMS) as of October 2016. According to an NPPD official, DHS has not developed a strategy, in part, because cyber threats involving these systems are an emerging issue. Do not developing a strategy document for assessing cyber risk to facility and security systems, DHS and, in particular, NPPD have not effectively addressed or begun the reporting and remediation efforts, to address the cyber risk facing federal facilities that DHS is responsible for protecting.
- Cyber threat not identified in report for federal agencies. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) which is housed within DHS and is responsible for developing physical security standards for nonmilitary federal facilities, has not incorporated cyber threats to building and access control systems in its Design Manual. DHS officials said that a better vision of an unified cyber world. The ISC official said that recent active shooter and work site violence incidents have caused ISC to focus its efforts on police in those areas first, incorporating the cyber threat to building and access control systems on that Design Manual. DHS officials will inform agencies about this threat so they can begin to assess its risk. This action also could prevent federal agencies from expending limited resources on methodologies that may result in duplication.



(U//FOUO) Defense in Depth Evaluation of an Operational SCADA Network

IIJA Case Study



Facility Security Plan: An Interagency Security Committee Guide

February 2015
1st Edition



UNCLASSIFIED


What's in Your Cloud?

- **Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)**
 - provide pay-per-utility pricing, dynamic scaling, security control, faster provisioning and guaranteed performance levels
- **Platform as a Service (PaaS)**
 - deliver lower operational cost, faster development, and seamless integration
- **Software as a Service (SaaS)**
 - improves upgrade cycle times, automated backups, and location independence




Better & More Secure to Outsource? \$ vs Security

Example – Topology & Mission Heat Map



Example: Disruption of Fuel System



 **1. Phishing attack via the Internet**





2. Reconnaissance on NIPRNet to identify PLC controller of pump

- **Specific Attack:** Internet phishing attack targets unpatched system
- **Level of Effort:** Script Kiddies to access CS systems
- **Impact:** Lack of ability to execute OPLAN

3. Persistent normal PLC shutdown commands stop fuel delivery

Mitigations & Results


#	NIST CSF Phase	Finding	Mitigation	Blue Skill Level	Estimated Cost	System	System Owner
1	Protect	Extensive connectivity	Isolate networks	I - Patch (IAT / IAM)	\$	NIPRNET	Comms squad
2	Identify	No CS monit at system level	Establish CS monitoring	III - Active Defense	\$\$	Network Defense	Comms squad
3	Protect	Lack of patch mgt system	Perform config mgt	I - Patch (IAT / IAM)	\$\$\$	Fuels Mgr	DLA



Blue skill level: I – patching, II – investigating, III – active defense, IV – integrators, V – architects, system designers
 \$: 10Ks, \$\$: 100Ks, \$\$\$: 1 Ms, \$\$\$\$: 10Ms, \$\$\$\$: 100Ms; Mitigation effect levels based on DSB Tiers 1-6

“Cyber Trust” Rating...What’s Yours?

- Rating # Correlates to Breach Potential
- Detailed Event and Configuration Information via External Parties



EVENTS

Botnet Infections	F
Spam Propagation	B
Malware Servers	A
Unsolicited Communication	B
Potentially Exploited	C

DILIGENCE

SPF Domains	C
DKIM Records	F
TLS/SSL Certificates	C
TLS/SSL Configurations	B
Open Ports	C
DNSSEC Records ^{beta}	C
Application Security ^{beta}	C

USER BEHAVIOR

File Sharing	D
--------------	----------

OTHER

Data Breaches	A
---------------	----------

Events are observed incidents of compromise on a company's network. These include risk vectors such as botnet infections and malware servers. Industry averages are calculated from similarly sized companies.

THIS WEEK PAST YEAR AVERAGE EVENT DURATION

10 **1,416** **2.8 days**

3.4% faster to resolve events than the Manufacturing industry average.

2.8 days **Company U**

2.1 days Portfolio average

2.9 days Manufacturing industry average

SECURITY RATING LEGEND:

ADVANCED (900-740)

INTERMEDIATE (740-640)

BASIC (640-250)

Company	Trend	Rating
[Redacted]		580
[Redacted]		630
[Redacted]		720
[Redacted]		710
[Redacted]		770
[Redacted]		710
[Redacted]		680
[Redacted]		600
[Redacted]		650
[Redacted]		380

Company	Trend	Rating
[Redacted]		750
[Redacted]		760
[Redacted]		750
[Redacted]		660
[Redacted]		590
[Redacted]		750
[Redacted]		730
[Redacted]		490
[Redacted]		560

ABOUT BITSIGHT

BitSight Technologies' mission is to provide organizations with the insight they need to proactively identify, quantify and mitigate

security risk. The company's platform continuously collects and analyzes vast amounts of external evidence on security behaviors in order to help organizations make timely, data driven risk management decisions. Based in Cambridge, MA, BitSight Technologies was founded in 2011. For more information, please visit www.bitsighttech.com or follow BitSight on Twitter @BitSight.

BITSIGHT

Security Rating Report

PORTFOLIO STATISTICS

COMPANIES

19

IP ADDRESSES

9,868,600

INDUSTRIES

5

MEDIAN SECURITY RATING


660

RANGE OF SECURITY RATINGS

380-770

Analysis of 27,458 companies reveals companies with ratings >400 are **5X** more likely to have experienced a publicly disclosed breach.

US Chamber Comm Dec




- Not mine
- Not funded

- Not Mine
- Not funded

<http://abcnews.go.com/International/chinese-hack-us-chamber-commerce-authorities/story?id=15207642>

Discussion

Information Systems



Control Systems



Who's Role? Detect, Mitigate & Recover from Cyber Exploit

WHAT'S NEXT?

....Your organization failed to consider impact of exploiting control systems....

Target Retail Stores - 2013

BACKDOOR ATTACK



The attackers backed their way into network by compromising a 3rd-party vendor to steal data.

Kemuri Water Company - 2016

PLC ATTACK



Hack accessed hundreds of PLCs used to manipulate control applications altering chemicals.

Saudi Aramco & RasGas

ENTERPRISE ATTACK



Networks infected with the Shamoon virus erased information causing enterprise network outages.

Ukraine Utilities - 2015

SCADA ATTACK



Left 225,000 customers in the dark. 1st successful cyber attack to knock a power grid offline.

Project Basecamp - 2012

PLC ATTACK



A team used a penetration test on PLCs to realize how badly vulnerable their SCADA/ICS were .

"Unnamed" Steel Mill, Germany - 2014

INSIDER ATTACK



Hackers disrupted networks to access automation equipment resulted in massive damage.

"Unnamed" Steel Mill - 2011

ENTERPRISE INFECTION



The Conficker worm infected the control network causing an instability in the communications.

New York Dam - 2013

BACKDOOR ATTACK



Iranian hackers tried to open flood gates. Was this a dress rehearsal for something bigger?

Natanz Nuclear Facility - 2010

SCADA MALWARE



Stuxnet infected the air-gapped control network bypassing causing damage to centrifuge.

Google HQ, Wharf - 2013

MISS-CONFIGURE



SHODAN discovered over 21,000 miss-configured building automation systems.

Maroochy Water System - 2010

INSIDER ATTACK



Disgruntled ex-employee hacks into the water system and floods the community of sewage.

New Malware Deliberately Destroys IoT Devices

April 7, 201

- Uses known default user credentials to attack unsecured IoT devices & destroy them
- Discovered by Radware - BrickerBot.1 / BrickerBot.2 – targets Linux BusyBox-based device open Telnet ports
- Renders devices inoperable w/in seconds via PDoS (*Permanent Denial of Service*) or "phlashing" attacks
 - BrickerBot.1 via worldwide IPs likely assigned to Ubiquiti network devices, BrickerBot.2 attacks are hidden behind Tor exit nodes and difficult to trace
- Motive uncertain; it destroys w/o benefiting destroyer
- Could be vigilante alerting users to unsecured devices.





ENERGY,
INSTALLATIONS
AND ENVIRONMENT

DoD & Commercial Resources

DoD CIO Knowledge Service (requires CAC) <https://rmfks.osd.mil/login.htm>

Department of Defense Advanced Control System Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) 2017:

http://www.wbdg.org/pdfs/aci_ttp_rev1_2017.pdf

UFC 4-010-06 CYBERSECURITY OF FACILITY-RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS Sept 2016

<https://wbdg.org/ffc/dod/unified-facilities-criteria-ufc/ufc-4-010-06>

Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) [info & funding solicitations]

<https://serdp-estcp.org/Investigator-Resources/ESTCP-Resources/Demonstration-Plans/Cybersecurity-Guidelines>

DoD OASD(EI&E) and Federal Facilities Council (FFC), under the National Research Council (NRC) sponsored a 3-day Building Control System Cyber Resilience Forum in Nov '15.

http://sites.nationalacademies.org/DEPS/FFC/DEPS_166792

DoDI 5000.02 Cybersecurity in the Defense Acquisition System Jan 2017

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500002_dodi_2015.pdf

Tools

Whole Building Design Guide website cyber references

<http://www.wbdg.org/resources/cybersecurity>

<https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/ICS-ALERT-14-176-02A>

<https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B>

Workshops / Building Control Systems Cyber Security Training

<http://hpac.com/training/workshop-what-do-when-building-control-systems-get-hacked-set>

Industrial Control Systems Joint Working Group (ICSJWG_

<https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Industrial-Control-Systems-Joint-Working-Group-ICSJWG>

Questions

Please wait for the **microphone** before asking your questions



State your **name & organization**

Please don't forget to...

Complete the Survey for this session



The Power of Data
DECISION READY IN REAL-TIME

Evaluation Form (Seminar Location - Date)

Name: _____ Company: _____
Email: _____

Quality and content of the presentations	Poor	Good	Excellent	N/A
Welcome	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The Journey To Real-Time Operational Intelligence	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The Power of Connection	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Tank Level Management System	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Using the FI System to Aid in Troubleshooting Operational Aspects of Oil and Gas Well Drilling and Completion	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unleash your Infrastructure	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Information on the Spot	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wrap-up/Seminar Conclusion	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Quality and organization of the seminar				
Choice of date	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Time allowed for lunch/breaks	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Choice of presentations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Excess time allowed for the presentations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

© Copyright 2017 OSIsoft, LLC