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# Strategies For Getting Information From The Control Network

Elliott Middleton – Product Director - operations control



AVEVA



# Elliott Middleton


Product Director – operations control

AVEVA

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# The Dilemma


Most of the Users



Business Network  
(Information Technology)



Supervisory Network  
(Operations Technology)



HMI/SCADA



Safety Critical

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
# Reasons to Bridge Domains

Make information  
more accessible

Fuel process  
improvement  
initiatives

Enable self-service  
analysis & reporting

# Threats



# Cybersecurity Threat



## 2019 Cybersecurity Survey

- Focused on operational technology (OT)
- At least one participant is an AVEVA Historian customer (Taiwan Semiconductor)
- 701 total participants


### Highlights:

- ? experienced plant *downtime* in the last 24 months
- ? experienced a nation-state attack


# Best Practice Architecture

NERC-CIP  
NIST

- No direct access between Supervisory/Business networks
- Only to adjacent network (DMZ)



# Common Architecture




- Less isolation than dual firewalls
- Simpler to use & manage

- Not the focus of this session
- DMZ-oriented models can be adapted




# General Approaches




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# Strategies to Bridge IT/OT



# Double RDP


- Approach
  - RDP Server in DMZ
  - Open RDP to DMZ from IT network, to OT from DMZ
- Pros
  - Gives users access
  - Simple to define & manage
  - Secure protocol
- Cons
  - Requires inbound access to DMZ, OT
  - Multiple user logins to manage (2-3)
  - Only user access
  - Higher resource requirements than some options
  - Need care to restrict rights appropriately
- Example Threat: Compromised credentials, user error



# Web Proxies




- In front of server
- Isolates servers



Clients

Proxy

Servers




- In front of clients
- Protects clients

# Reverse Web Proxy




- Approach
  - Proxy server in DMZ
  - Open Web to DMZ from IT network
  - Open Web to OT from DMZ
- Pros
  - Simple browser access
  - More narrow access
  - Proxy is mostly transparent to users
- Cons
  - Requires inbound access to DMZ, OT
  - Certificate management for HTTPS
  - Manage proxy settings
- Example Threat: Log4Js



# Reverse Web Proxy

## With Access Anywhere Gateway


- Approach
  - Proxy server in DMZ
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  - Open Web to OT from DMZ
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  - Simple browser access
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  - Certificate management for HTTPS
  - ~~Manage proxy settings~~
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# Forward Web Proxy




- Approach
  - Mirror to on-premises
  - Proxy server in DMZ for publishing
- Pros
  - No access to DMZ, OT required
  - Simple, broader access possible
  - Single Sign On (SSO) common
- Cons
  - Cost to maintain mirrored system
  - Manage “allow list” to limit access



# Forward Web Proxy

## With AVEVA Historian 2023 R2

- Approach
  - Mirror to on-premises
  - Proxy server in DMZ for publishing
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




# Forward Web Proxy

## With DMZ Secure Link


- Approach
  - Publish data to Cloud
  - Proxy server in DMZ for publishing
- Pros
  - No access to DMZ, OT required
  - Simple, broader access possible
  - Might use SSO
- Cons
  - Requires additional cloud subscription
  - ~~Manage “allow list” to protect against malware, exfiltration, updates~~
  - ~~Example Threat: malicious site~~



# Forward Web Proxy


## With DMZ Secure Link

- Approach
  - Publish data to Cloud
  - Proxy server in DMZ for publishing
- Pros
  - No access to DMZ, OT required
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  - Might use SSO
- Cons
  - Requires additional cloud subscription
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  - ~~Example Threat: malicious site~~





# Simple Firewall (no DMZ)

- Approach
  - Mirror to on-premises (IT) system
  - Connections *from* OT to IT only
- Pros
  - Simple user access
  - Single Sign On (SSO) common
- Cons
  - Less protection for OT
  - Cost to maintain mirrored system



# “Data Diode”

- Approach
  - Dual computers (vs. firewalls)
  - Connected with 1-way optical network
  - Proprietary mirroring
- Pros
  - Simple user access
  - Guaranteed 1-way “push”
- Cons
  - Unreliable delivery
  - Cost, proprietary solution
  - Cost to maintain mirrored systems
- Example Threat: Direct OT network & physical access



# Summary of Strategies



**Double RDP**

- Flexible access
- Simple to setup
- Secure protocol

- Inbound access
- Multiple logins
- More resources
- Limit rights



**Reverse Proxy**

- Simple browser
- Narrow access
- Nearly transparent


- Inbound access
- Certificate issues
- Manage proxy



**Forward Proxy**

- Simple access
- No DMZ/OT access
- SSO possible

- Mirrored system
- Manage allow list



**Data Diode**

- Simple access
- True one-way
- SSO possible


- Mirror system
- Cost
- Proprietary
- Unreliable delivery

# Other Challenges

# Certificate Basics

## Threats

- Eavesdropping
- Tampering
- Impersonating



Trusted Authority


## Challenges

- Authority
- Expiration
- Revocation



# Certificate Challenges

Trusted Authority



## Challenges


- Where to place authority?
- How to handle expiration
- Access to revocation list

# Certificate Options

- Pro: Internal Trust
- Con: Trust on OT



- Pro: Wide Trust
- Con:
  - Cost
  - Trust on OT




- Pro: Simple to create
- Con: No trust




- Pro: Internal Trust
- Con: Trust on IT


# User Identity



# Common User Identity



# Security Models



- “Castle & Moat”
  - All the threats are outside
  - Focus on securing the perimeter
  - Trust insiders
- Reality
  - Insiders can be compromised
  - “Good guys” can make mistakes

# Security Models




- “Castle & Moat”
  - All the threats are outside
  - Focus on securing the perimeter
  - Trust insiders
- Reality
  - Insiders can be compromised
  - “Good guys” can make mistakes
- “Zero Trust”
  - Treat every system as if it is exposed to the Internet
  - Block/deny by default

# Recommendations for Operations




- Begin “Zero Trust” on IT network



- Continue protecting the OT perimeter



- Expand “Zero Trust” to OT network



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# Reasons to Bridge Domains

Make information  
more accessible

Fuel process  
improvement  
initiatives

Enable self-service  
analysis & reporting



# Questions?

Please wait for the microphone.  
State your name and company.



# Please remember to...

Navigate to this session in the mobile app to complete the survey.



# Strategies For Getting Information From The Control Network

# Thank you!

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